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HOW TAX MODELS WORK 
Sarah B. Lawsky* 
Abstract: Unlike many social and physical sciences, legal scholarship in-
cludes little or no discussion of what models mean, how they are con-
nected to the real world of law and policy, or how they should, and should 
not, be used by legal scholars. This void exists notwithstanding legal 
scholarship’s increasing reliance on explicit modeling in fields such as law 
and economics. This Article uses the example of economic modeling in 
tax scholarship to investigate how legal scholarship uses models, and how 
models in legal scholarship work. The Article lays out a path between two 
extremes. At one extreme is scholarship that employs models without ei-
ther reflection or self-consciousness to make real-world recommenda-
tions; at the other is scholarship that rejects models because their assump-
tions are too far from reality. This Article argues that neither approach is 
correct. Models are useful and important for legal scholarship, but not in 
the way that some critics and proponents seem to believe. Drawing from 
literature in the philosophy of science, this Article argues that we reason 
from economic models through a mix of deductive and ampliative logic, 
through leaps, creativity, and intuition. Models cannot provide certainty 
about what the law should be; rather, economic models are merely one 
kind of voice in an ongoing and necessarily inconclusive conversation. 
This Article concludes by drawing on this deeper understanding of mod-
els and modeling to propose ways that legal scholarship can and should 
use economic models. 
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Models are at bottom tools for approximate thinking; they serve to transform 
your intuition. . . . You must start with models and then overlay them with 
common sense and experience. 
—Emanuel Derman & Paul Wilmott1 
Introduction 
 Imagine a very simple model of tax compliance: a person complies 
with the tax law when she believes that the expected value, measured in 
dollars, of complying is greater than the expected value, measured in 
dollars, of not complying.2 What can we learn from this model about 
the real world? To answer this question, we need to know how this mod-
el is meant to tell us about the world. What is the mechanism by which we 
are supposed to learn about the world from a model? 
 Here is one critique of this simple model: “People take things into 
account other than just the dollar value of the penalty when they are 
trying to figure out what will happen to them if they do not comply 
with the tax law.” Here is another critique: “Your model deals with 
something called ‘dollars,’ so it does not apply to my situation, because 
I am trying to figure out tax compliance in Belgium, where the cur-
rency is called ‘Euros.’” The first critique seems useful; the second one 
does not. But why? Unlike many social and physical sciences, including 
economics, biology, and physics, legal scholarship includes little or no 
discussion of what models mean, how they are connected to the real 
world of law and policy, or how models should and should not be used 
by legal scholars. This void exists notwithstanding legal scholarship’s 
increasing reliance on explicit modeling, including, for example, work 
in law and economics and in empirical legal studies. This Article en-
gages scholarship on the philosophy of modeling in order to under-
stand how legal scholarship does and should use models. 
 This Article lays out a path between two extremes. At one extreme 
is scholarship that employs models without either reflection or self-
consciousness to make real-world recommendations; at the other is 
scholarship that rejects models because their assumptions are too far 
from reality. This Article argues that neither approach is correct. Mod-
                                                                                                                      
1 Emanuel Derman & Paul Wilmott, The Financial Modelers’ Manifesto, Emanuel Der-
man’s Blog ( Jan. 8, 2009, 3:14 PM), http://www.wilmott.com/blogs/eman/ 
index.cfm/2009/1/8/The-Financial-Modelers-Manifesto. 
2 The expected value of an event is, of course, the probability of that event multiplied 
by the value of the event’s occurring. 
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els are useful and important for legal scholarship, but not in the way 
that both critics and proponents believe. 
 This Article neither attacks nor defends the use of models. It does 
not argue that law professors should not use economic models, or that 
law professors necessarily or even usually use economic models incor-
rectly. Rather, this Article explains a mechanism by which models may 
work. Specifically, this Article argues that we reason from models to the 
real world through leaps, creativity, and intuition. Once we understand 
the way models work, we can understand how to use and critique mod-
els more effectively. Economic models cannot provide certainty, but 
models are nonetheless one important voice in an ongoing, necessarily 
inconclusive conversation. 
 This Article has three main parts. The first is descriptive, and ex-
plores how tax legal scholarship uses economic models such as the op-
timal tax model and the expected utility model.3 The second is analytic, 
and asks what philosophy of science, in particular philosophy of eco-
nomics, tells us about models, both in general and in legal scholarship. 
The third is prescriptive, and uses this deeper understanding of models 
and modeling to describe and propose ways that tax legal scholarship 
can use models. 
 Part I defines “model” for purposes of this project, and then pro-
vides examples of two economic models and how tax legal scholars 
have used them.4 Part II draws on philosophy of science literature to lay 
out four possible ways that models could work and concludes that 
models in legal tax literature are best considered as creating credible 
worlds from which we may reason ampliatively to the real world.5 Part 
III shows how the credible world understanding of models can improve 
how legal scholarship uses models.6 
                                                                                                                      
3 The arrow can go the other way, too. I ask what models can teach us about law, but as 
Peter Diamond has described, we can also ask what law can teach us about models. Peter 
Diamond, My Research Strategy, in Eminent Economists II: Their Work and Life Phi-
losophies (Michael Szenberg & Lall Ramrattan eds.) (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5), 
available at http://economics.mit.edu/files/6139 (“I started taking classes at Harvard Law 
School, planning to write on law and economics, hoping to find some question in that 
realm that would be a route to what I was really interested in—the importance for resource 
allocation that trade happens in real time, rather than in the all-at-once way of Arrow-
Debreu theory. That is, I was hoping that thinking about a concrete legal problem would 
lead to modeling that captured a real time process and resulted in insights that would be 
more generally usable.”). 
4 See infra notes 7–61 and accompanying text. 
5 See infra notes 62–145 and accompanying text. 
6 See infra notes 146–180 and accompanying text. 
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I. Models in Action 
 This Part defines “model” for purposes of this Article and then pro-
vides examples of economic models as used in tax legal scholarship.7 
A. What Is a Model? 
 This Article focuses on one kind of economic model. For purposes 
of this Article, a scholar uses an economic model whenever he or she 
argues deductively from exactly specified economic premises, either 
implicitly or explicitly.8 This Section expands on each element of this 
definition. 
1. Deductive Reasoning 
 A model, as defined for purposes of this Article, uses deductive 
reasoning.9 The validity of a deductive argument depends on the prop-
er application of logical rules.10 For example, the following is a valid 
deductive argument: If we assume that all donkeys are red, and that I 
am a donkey, then we conclude, logically, that I am red. It does not 
matter that not all donkeys are red, nor that I am not a donkey; the 
point is that if both those things were true, then I would be red. The 
truth (as opposed to the validity) of a deductive argument does, how-
ever, depend on the truth of its premises and assumptions. It is not true 
that I am red, so it must be the case either that not all donkeys are red, 
or that I am not a donkey. In some sense, deductive reasoning does not 
increase our knowledge; rather, it “orders and rearranges” it.11 Because 
models use deductive reasoning, a model’s conclusions come inexora-
bly from applying logical rules to the model’s assumptions.12 A purely 
deductive argument can add no facts to those already implicit in the 
                                                                                                                      
7 See infra notes 8–61 and accompanying text. 
8 Allan Gibbard & Hal R. Varian, Economic Models, 75 J. Phil. 664, 666 (1978). Other 
kinds of models, including computer simulations and statistical models, raise different, 
albeit related, issues; this Article does not discuss such models. 
9 Id. at 668. 
10 Id. at 670. 
11 John Vickers, The Problem of Induction, Stan. Encyclopedia Phil. ( June 21, 2010), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/induction-problem/; see also Brian 
Skyrms, Choice and Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic 18 (4th ed. 2000) 
(stating that in a deductively valid argument, “the factual claim made by the conclusion is 
already implicit in the premises”). 
12 Gibbard & Varian, supra note 8, at 670. 
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argument’s premises.13 Deductive reasoning is therefore purely explica-
tive. 
 Deductive reasoning thus contrasts with ampliative reasoning. 
Ampliative reasoning, which includes but is not limited to inductive 
reasoning, goes beyond what an argument logically implies.14 Funda-
mentally, what sets ampliative reasoning apart from deductive reason-
ing is that ampliative reasoning is not compelled—it is not necessary.15 
Rather, ampliative reasoning is contingent. Ampliative reasoning adds 
something to our knowledge that is not contained by necessity in the 
premises of the argument.16 Ampliative reasoning is also famously diffi-
cult to justify,17 but it is nonetheless pervasive, as we shall see. Eco-
nomic models, as defined for purposes of this Article, use solely deduc-
tive logic internally, and thus are explicative, not ampliative, internally. 
                                                                                                                     
2. Economic Premises 
 This Article concerns itself with economic models. Because a model, 
in my definition, is simply a set of assumptions subject to deductive rea-
soning, the assumptions themselves—their subject and substance— 
 
13 This does not mean, of course, that deductive arguments add nothing to knowledge. 
See infra notes 149–156 and accompanying text (discussing further the value of deductive 
arguments). 
14 Vickers, supra note 11. A variety of types of reasoning are ampliative—indeed, any 
reasoning other than deductive reasoning is ampliative. Ampliative reasoning includes 
induction, both in the modern and classical sense, as well as abduction. In the modern 
sense, an argument is “inductively strong” if the argument “is not deductively valid but 
nevertheless the premises provide good evidence for the conclusion.” Skyrms, supra note 
11, at 17. The classical sense of induction, a subset of the modern sense, is reasoning from 
the part to the whole. E.g., Aristotle, Prior Analytics 99 (Robin Smith trans., Hackett 
Publ’g Co. 1989) (350 B.C.E.). Induction can include reasoning from the specific to the 
general (“I have seen five ducks that are yellow, and I therefore conclude that all ducks are 
yellow”), or from the specific to a particular prediction (“I have seen five ducks that are 
yellow, and I therefore conclude that the next duck that I see will be yellow”). Abductive 
arguments, in contrast to inductive arguments, give weight to whether a conclusion seems 
to be a good explanation for a hypothesis. An abductive argument “posits . . . a connection 
between explanatory force and trust.” Igor Douven, Abduction, Stan. Encyclopedia Phil. 
(Mar. 9, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/abduction/. 
15 Skyrms, supra note 11, at 19. 
16 E.g., id. (“If an argument is inductively strong, its conclusion makes factual claims 
that go beyond the factual information given in the premises. . . . [T]he advantage which 
inductively strong arguments have over deductively valid ones [is] the possibility of discov-
ery and prediction of new facts on the basis of old ones.”). 
17 Vickers, supra note 11; see David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 86–94 (Ox-
ford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1739–1740) (offering a classic statement of the problem of 
induction). 
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must be what makes a model an economic model. Thus we can say that 
this Article addresses only models that reason from economic premises. 
 The substantive definition of economics is itself a contested ques-
tion. The best definition is probably that economics is what economists 
do. Economics is an academic discipline, and the studies of people in 
that discipline thus create the answer to the question of what economics 
is. Economics is what legal scholars find when we look to economic 
scholars for insight. That said, Lionel Robbins’s definition may come 
closest to what is described in this Article: economic science studies “the 
forms assumed by human behavior in disposing of scarce means.”18 
Judge Richard Posner embraces a similar definition: “economics is the 
science of rational choice in a world . . . in which resources are limited 
in relation to human wants.”19 Much broader definitions are possible— 
the leading economics textbook, for example, adopts nineteenth-
century economist Alfred Marshall’s definition, that “[e]conomics is a 
study of mankind in the ordinary business of life.”20 At any rate, com-
mon neoclassical economic assumptions are familiar, including the 
main assumption that people are rational decisionmakers who act to 
maximize their own utility.21 This Article discusses only neoclassical 
models, though its reasoning could apply to other types of economics as 
well. 
3. Implicit and Explicit Models 
 Quite dissimilar arguments, in form, at least, may be models, or 
based on models.22 A mathematical model is, of course, a model. Purely 
mathematical models rarely appear in legal scholarship, however. Ra-
ther, legal scholarship tends to use a technical, mathematical model by 
mentioning it and then casually (as opposed to formally) describing 
some of its implications; I consider such use to be part of my inquiry 
here. For example, a scholar uses an economic model when she de-
scribes, in words, the “economic model of crime advanced by Gary 
                                                                                                                      
18 Lionel Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Sci-
ence 15 (2d ed., rev. & expanded 1945). 
19 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 3 (8th ed. 2011). 
20 N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics, at ix (6th ed. 2010). 
21 See, e.g., id. at 6. 
22 My use of the term model blurs together Allan Gibbard and Hal Varian’s distinction 
between “models” and “applied models.” See Gibbard & Varian, supra note 8, at 667. 
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Becker” and then provides a “simplified example” that is mostly textual, 
as opposed to numerical.23 
 In addition, for purposes of this Article, a statement that implicitly 
includes economic assumptions, together with the reasoning that fol-
lows from that statement and the implicit assumptions, is also a model. 
Thus, a scholar who refers to the “simple approach to the problem of 
tax compliance [that] holds that when people decide whether to pay 
their taxes, they take account only of the cost of the tax and the ex-
pected legal sanction from noncompliance” uses an economic model.24 
B. Models in Tax Legal Scholarship 
 This Section provides two examples of economic models and how 
they are used in tax legal scholarship. It first focuses on the optimal tax 
model, and shows how scholars have used this model as a general guide 
to policy and law.25 It then examines the expected utility model and 
shows how scholars have used this model to support direct arguments 
about a specific policy.26 
1. The Optimal Tax Model as a General Guide to Policy and Law 
 The optimal tax model, first proposed by James Mirrlees, models 
the best tax rate structure for earned income, where the “best” struc-
ture is the structure that maximizes societal welfare.27 Mirrlees’s model 
balances two concerns: that the next dollar is worth more to a poorer 
person than to a richer person, and that higher taxes may dissuade 
people from working.28 This model has been used in legal scholarship 
primarily as a general guide to policy and law. It has been presented 
not as the basis of specific, detailed recommendations, but rather to 
support a general legal approach. Scholarship that uses this model, 
consistent with how models are often presented in economics litera-
ture, usually does not explain how to connect the model to the real 
                                                                                                                      
23 Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 
Ohio St. L.J. 1453, 1463–68 (2003). 
24 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 Va. L. 
Rev. 1781, 1783 (2000) (referring to the statement, and a discussion of its implications, as 
a model). 
25 See infra notes 27–47 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 48–61 and accompanying text. 
27 See generally J.A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 
Rev. Econ. Stud. 175 (1971) (developing a model of optimum income taxation). 
28 Id. 
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world, whether through law or policy.29 Nonetheless, these articles sug-
gest that their models give us information about the real world. 
 For example, Joseph Bankman and Thomas Griffith’s article Social 
Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, which in-
troduced optimal tax theory to the legal literature, uses the optimal tax 
model to provide a “normative underpinning” for a progressive rate 
structure.30 Bankman and Griffith select this model because, they say, it 
is a “reliable method for assessing the level of social welfare associated 
with [a] particular rate structure.”31 By “reliable,” the authors seem to 
mean something like “manageable” or “capable of being implemented,” 
as opposed to “accurate.”32 Their article also embraces the optimal tax 
model because it could be used under “varying assumptions,” thus per-
mitting a “search for robust results—that is, results that remain constant 
over . . . a wide range of assumptions.”33 
 Bankman and Griffith do not make specific policy proposals, but 
they do suggest that their model should be taken into account when 
structuring the tax system.34 Bankman and Griffith’s article argues that 
the optimal tax model recommends a particular tax structure, but that 
“[t]he merit of [this conclusion] depends . . . on the validity of the op-
timal tax model.”35 By “validity,” the authors appear to mean something 
about the realism of the “simplifying assumptions” underlying the 
model.36 The article examines four of these assumptions that it states 
“have particular importance to tax policy,”37 and finds that altering the-
se assumptions leaves the “optimal shape of the tax structure” (that is, 
progressive) “essentially unchanged.”38 To adjust these assumptions, 
the authors draw from various empirical studies to estimate the “real” 
values of various factors in the optimal tax model.39 
                                                                                                                      
29 See, e.g., Robert Sugden, Credible Worlds: The Status of Theoretical Models in Economics, 7 
J. Econ. Methodology 1, 33 (2000) (noting, in a discussion of two prominent models, 
“on closer inspections of the texts, it is difficult to find any explicit connection being made 
between the models and the real world”). 
30 Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look 
at Progressive Taxation, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 1905, 1907 (1987). 
31 Id. at 1945. 
32 See id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 1966–67. 
35 Id. at 1959. 
36 See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 30, at 1959. 
37 Id. That is, the authors perform a sort of robustness testing. 
38 Id. 
39 See id. at 1921–25. 
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 The authors position the article as an intervention in a theoretical 
debate, but they also claim that their work should have practical impli-
cations: “Although the optimal tax literature does not answer the ques-
tion of what the exact rate structure should be,” they aver, “it strongly 
suggests that if a goal of the tax system is to maximize individual wel-
fare, the rate structure should be progressive.”40 
 Similarly, in The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal 
Income Tax, Joseph Bankman and David Weisbach investigate one par-
ticular model within the optimal tax framework—that put forth by An-
thony Atkinson and Joseph Stiglitz in 197641—to shed light on what they 
view as “the single most important tax policy decision [:] the choice be-
tween an income tax and a consumption tax.”42 They note that they 
“compare only the ideal forms of income and consumption taxation. 
The actual choice of a tax system has to be based on how the system 
would be implemented.”43 They investigate the ideal forms to “help[] us 
design actual systems” and to “understand the flaws of actual systems.”44 
 Bankman and Weisbach acknowledge that the model on which 
they focus “contains assumptions and simplifications,” and they distin-
guish their work from the issue of the actual design of income or con-
sumption taxes.45 Nonetheless, their article is not limited to the theo-
retical. Much of the article plays out the implications of the model, 
adding complications, including certain types of irrationality.46 Al-
though Bankman and Weisbach repeatedly emphasize that their article 
addresses only ideal tax systems, they also speculate that “[a] compari-
son of nonideal systems would likely strengthen [their] conclusion.”47 
They do not, however, expand on this claim, and they do not suggest 
that the Atkinson and Stiglitz model leads directly to this conclusion. 
Their article thus investigates one particular model and its implications 
in great depth, and suggests some ways in which future work could ex-
pand the model or relax its assumptions, but it does not explicitly link 
the model to real-world proposals. 
                                                                                                                      
40 Id. at 1966–67. 
41 Anthony Atkinson & Joseph Stiglitz, The Design of Tax Structure: Direct Versus Indirect 
Taxation, 6 J. Pub. Econ. 55, 56 (1976). 
42 Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over 
an Ideal Income Tax, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1413, 1414 (2006). 
43 Id. at 1414–15. 
44 Id. at 1415. 
45 See id. at 1430 n.33 (“The design of tax systems is beyond the scope of this Article, 
which merely considers ideal tax systems.”). 
46 Id. at 1444–48. 
47 Id. at 1455. 
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2. The Expected Utility Model as a Blueprint for the Law 
 The expected utility model hinges on the idea that people decide 
whether to take a tax position by weighing the expected utility of taking 
the position against the expected utility of not complying, where ex-
pected utility is determined by weighting each possible outcome by its 
probability.48 Slightly more technically, the expected utility model imag-
ines a taxpayer who begins with income I. If the taxpayer does not take 
the position, he will pay tax of T. If he does take the position and the 
position is not ultimately struck down, he will not have to pay the tax. If 
the position is struck down, though, he will have to pay the tax and a 
fine, F, and thus his income will equal I – T – F. The chance that the 
position will be struck down is represented by p. (In this version of the 
model, p represents a blended probability that takes into account all 
relevant probabilities, including the chance that the taxpayer will be 
audited, the chance that if he is audited, his position will be detected, 
and the chance that if the position is detected, it will be struck down.) 
Thus, where the taxpayer’s utility is represented by U(*), and utility is 
determined only by income, the expected utility model says that the 
taxpayer will take a particular position when 
pU(I – T – F) + (1 – p)U(I) > U(I – T) 
 Perhaps because the expected utility model is so intuitive, some 
legal scholars have used it as the basis for specific proposals for how law 
should be changed. Alex Raskolnikov, for example, has used the ex-
pected utility model to propose a new type of tax penalty, the “self-
adjusting penalty,” which increases as the chance of the position’s being 
detected decreases.49 The key element of the expected utility model for 
Raskolnikov is that outcomes are weighted by probabilities.50 Thus, he 
argues, as the probability of detection decreases (which would result in 
a decrease in p), the magnitude of the penalty (F) should increase.51 
                                                                                                                      
48 See, e.g., James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. Econ. Literature 818, 823–24 
(1998). 
49 See generally Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and 
the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 569 (2006) (proposing that tax avoidance 
penalties set forth in the Internal Revenue Code be adjusted to reflect the probability that 
such tax avoidance will be detected). Raskolnikov actually applies a somewhat simplified 
version of this model—the expected value model—which compares not the utility of dol-
lars, but rather dollars themselves. This is equivalent to assuming that taxpayers are risk-
neutral. See Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility and Tax Policy, 95 Minn. 
L. Rev. 904, 916–17 (2011). 
50 Raskolnikov, supra note 49, at 599. 
51 Id. 
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 Raskolnikov acknowledges both the many assumptions underlying 
economic modeling and other, noneconomic explanations of taxpay-
ers’ behavior. He concedes that “even if we posit purely rational taxpay-
ers, we would be unable to derive clear policy prescriptions from the 
existing economic models.”52 Nonetheless, he concludes that “eco-
nomic models offer numerous valuable insights for which we should 
find . . . practical applications. . . . [W]e should rely on the clear impli-
cations of the [expected utility model] to detect and reform” tax law.53 
And indeed, Raskolnikov’s proposal is extremely detailed. He specifies 
the types of tax positions to which the penalty should apply (subtrac-
tion items only, including deductions, credits, and losses);54 he explains 
how the amount of the penalty should be determined (based on the 
size of legitimate subtractions of the same type);55 and he even suggests 
how tax returns should be designed to implement the penalty.56 He 
frequently moves between the models and real-life constraints, but 
sometimes seems to do so reluctantly. For example, he laments that 
“tax evasion models are simply not designed to analyze” a certain type 
of deterrence, and thus, because “the theoretical framework needed to 
reach [this type of deterrence] is largely absent,” he will settle for the 
“third-best alternative of improving (rather than optimizing)” our tax 
system.57 
 Similarly, Daniel Shaviro uses the expected utility model to argue 
against fault-based tax penalties.58 He writes that 
tax evaders are modeled as making risky investments that pay 
off in the form of reduced taxes unless the evasion is de-
tected, corrected, and penalized. . . . [I]n the simple case of a 
risk-neutral taxpayer evading $1 million of taxes with a 20 
percent probability of being caught, a penalty of 400 percent 
. . . would leave both the taxpayer and a risk-neutral govern-
ment indifferent between evasion and compliance.59 
He claims that adapting this model “to deal with ex ante legal uncer-
tainty” is “straightforward,” and concludes that “treating bad faith as a 
                                                                                                                      
52 Id. at 579. 
53 Id. at 642. 
54 Id. at 626. 
55 Id. at 601. 
56 Raskolnikov, supra note 49, at 606. 
57 Id. at 612 (emphasis omitted). 
58 Daniel Shaviro, Disclosure and Civil Penalty Rules in the U.S. Legal Response to Tax Shel-
ters, in Tax and Corporate Governance 229 (Wolfgang Schön ed., 2008). 
59 Id. at 239. 
1668 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1657 
penalty prerequisite is dubious . . . in theory.”60 Shaviro does not draw 
any conclusions about how penalties should be structured directly from 
this model; indeed, he acknowledges that this model is “clearly less 
than perfect in [its] assumptions” and “perhaps best suited to the cor-
porate context.”61 The bulk of his article investigates the actual law and 
the institutional effects of fault-based penalties. The model seems to 
serve as one support for his ultimate conclusion, though, that the U.S. 
tax system should not have fault-based penalties. 
 These scholars’ approaches to both the optimal tax model and the 
expected utility model illustrate reasoning from models to the real 
world. Part II of this Article explores how these leaps from models to 
the real world might be justified. 
II. Four Ways Models Might Work 
 As the previous Part describes, tax legal scholarship uses economic 
models both as general guides to the law and as support for specific 
legal proposals. But because legal scholarship provides no account of 
how models should be used, and in particular how models can (or 
cannot) be linked to the real world, scholarship that uses such models 
opens itself to the same basic criticisms that have dogged economics for 
years, including the criticism that their models are too unrealistic. This 
Part investigates four ways that models may work: as purely conceptual 
exercises,62 as representations of the real world,63 as predictors,64 and 
as credible worlds.65 Part III then concludes that models in tax legal 
scholarship are best understood as representing credible worlds.66 
A. Exploration 
 It does not matter how models could be applied to the real world to 
the extent that legal scholarship, like some economic scholarship, is 
concerned not at all with applying economic models to the real world, 
but rather merely with studying the models themselves. Such scholar-
ship would use models only for “conceptual exploration,”67 to apply “ba-
                                                                                                                      
60 Id. at 240, 242. 
61 Id. at 239. 
62 See infra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. 
63 See infra notes 71–92 and accompanying text. 
64 See infra notes 93–120 and accompanying text. 
65 See infra notes 121–145 and accompanying text. 
66 See infra notes 146–180 and accompanying text. 
67 Daniel M. Hausman, The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics 221 
(1992). 
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sic principles to particular problems.”68 As philosopher Daniel Haus-
man explains, some economists 
                                                                                                                     
merely construct[] concepts and employ[] mathematics and 
logic to explore further properties which are implied by the 
definitions they have offered. Such model building and theo-
rem proving does not presuppose that one believes that the 
particular model is of any use in understanding the world. . . . 
Insofar as one is only working with a model, one can dismiss 
any questions about the realism of the assumptions one makes 
[because] one is saying nothing about the world. . . . [N]o em-
pirical claims have been made. Insofar as one is only working 
with a model, one’s efforts are purely conceptual or mathe-
matical.69 
 I could find no example of a tax legal scholar who did not try in 
some way to evaluate how his model matched up with the real world.70 
This consistent attempt to connect to the real world may, however, not 
be such a good thing. Of course, one may wonder why legal academics 
should engage in “purely conceptual or mathematical” reasoning; after 
all, how can we say we are studying law if we are merely chasing down 
mathematical questions or playing out logical implications? 
 There are at least two benefits to conceptual investigation by legal 
scholars, and one caveat. First, a purely conceptual investigation can 
suggest areas of future research by serving as one step in a deductive 
chain that ultimately leads to the leap to the real world. One person 
might write an article that investigates a particular model conceptually. 
The next person might add on to that model or critique a particular 
assumption, perhaps making the model more credible. This may con-
tinue until finally somebody takes the leap from the model to our 
world. Different scholars are good at different things, after all. 
 
68 Id. at 95. 
69 Id. at 79. 
70 For example Louis Kaplow cautions that 
the sometimes stark results presented . . . are offered as benchmarks for think-
ing, not as one-size-fits-all prescriptions for policy. The purpose of this book is 
not to champion particular policies or analytical results but rather to urge a new 
way of thinking. . . . [I]t is the course of future research that will indicate the 
value of the theory . . . that is advanced here. 
Louis Kaplow, The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics 415–16 (2008). None-
theless, Kaplow does discuss actual policy issues throughout the book, and he notes where 
more empirical research would be useful. 
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 Second and relatedly, purely conceptual investigation can suggest 
areas of future empirical research. Someone might propose a purely 
conceptual model but decline to link the model to the real world be-
cause he does not know whether a particular fact holds true in the real 
world. He can conclude only that, within his model, given all the other 
assumptions of the model, “If A, then B,” but he has no idea whether A 
is even close to true in the real world. Someone else, seeing the as-
sumption in the model, might decide to test that assumption empiri-
cally—he might, for example, run a laboratory experiment to see 
whether A seems to be true. Upon finding that A is overwhelmingly 
supported by his tests, the second person might then decide that it is 
warranted to link the model to the real world. 
 All this is subject, however, to an important caveat: if a model is a 
purely conceptual exercise, it cannot be more than that. The claim that 
a model is a purely conceptual speculation is not a defense against cri-
tiques of that model; rather, a purely speculative model is best seen, like 
a model that creates a credible world, as part of an ongoing conversa-
tion. If a purely speculative model provides deductive links in a chain, 
then others may make arguments about whether that model presents a 
credible world and thus warrants extension to the real world. The re-
sponse to the claim that a model does not present a credible world 
should not be, “Well, yes, but I meant this model to be purely specula-
tive.” A purely speculative model makes no claims about the real world, 
and thus someone who argues that the model does not extend to the 
real world does not contradict that model, but simply helps us under-
stand whether we should consider the speculative model when thinking 
about the real world. 
 Although legal scholars do not typically use models simply to spec-
ulate about the models themselves, they could, and perhaps should, 
sometimes use models in this way. 
B. Representations of the Real World 
 Because legal scholars often intend that their discussion of models 
connects to the real world, models might seem to be representations of 
the real world, and thus “good” only if their assumptions are “close 
enough” to the real world. Critiques of economic models often claim 
that these models’ assumptions are too far from reality, and that the 
models are therefore not useful. Alex Raskolnikov, for example, argues 
that because of the “disconnect between tax theory and reality,” the 
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reach of tax law and economics is “relatively limited.”71 He claims that 
economic analysis is “dramatically less successful” in tax than in other 
areas of the law, and that it has “little to offer . . . decisionmakers” be-
cause of the many assumptions needed to use economic models to ana-
lyze tax systems.72 
 Indeed, the models discussed in Part I are based on deeply unreal-
istic assumptions. James Mirrlees, the original creator of the optimal 
tax model that Joseph Bankman and Thomas Griffith’s article expli-
cates, acknowledged some of the many assumptions on which his mod-
el relied.73 Among those assumptions are that all people have the same 
tastes, and that voluntary transfers are impossible; that individuals de-
termine whether to work based on rational calculations; that people are 
unable to move out of the United States; that the government has per-
fect information about everyone in the economy; and that there are no 
costs to administering the tax system.74 Obviously, none of these as-
sumptions is true. 
 Critiques of Anthony Atkinson and Joseph Stiglitz’s extension of 
the optimal taxation model, as applied in Joseph Bankman and David 
Weisbach’s article, have also focused on critiquing the assumptions un-
derlying the model. Daniel Shaviro argues that the model depends on 
three assumptions, none of which is satisfied. First, the Atkinson-Stiglitz 
result supports consumption taxation only if one assumes complete 
markets, that is, markets that “cover every possible commodity and 
combination thereof.”75 Second, the result requires that people are ra-
tional and consistent.76 People must have the same preferences and 
make the same choices, regardless of how information is presented to 
them. They must not, for example, overweight current benefits as 
compared to future benefits.77 Third, the result assumes that a policy-
maker receives no information relevant for distributional questions 
from the time period during which a taxpayer spends money.78 Measur-
ing lifetime earnings under the Atkinson-Stiglitz model, for example, 
                                                                                                                      
71 Alex Raskolnikov, Accepting the Limits of Tax Law and Economics, 98 Cornell L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 5) (on file with author). 
72 Id. 
73 Mirrlees, supra note 27, at 175–76; see Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 30, at 1946–
66. 
74 Id. 
75 Daniel Shaviro, Beyond the Pro-Consumption Tax Consensus, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 745, 749 
(2007). 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 749–50. 
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requires that we do not care, from a distributional perspective, whether 
a taxpayer spends money as a young person or as an older person.79 
Shaviro shows that none of these three assumptions are true, which, he 
says, “refute[s] the claim that an ideal consumption tax is decisively su-
perior to an ideal income tax, as judged from the standpoint, not of a 
stylized economic model, but of the actual world in which we live.”80 
 Similarly, Chris Sanchirico criticizes Bankman and Weisbach’s arti-
cle for, among other things, its strong and, he argues, unrealistic as-
sumptions.81 For example, Sanchirico notes that Bankman and Weis-
bach’s article envisions a world in which there is only a single taxpayer 
in each earning class, which is clearly not true.82 Sanchirico also cri-
tiques Bankman and Weisbach’s assumption that utility is “weakly sepa-
rable” in leisure—that is, that there is no commodity whose use in-
creases with increased leisure.83 
 The assumptions and elements of the expected utility model are 
also much criticized. For example, the expected utility model assumes 
that people are rational cost-benefit maximizers, which they are not.84 
It is not possible to measure individuals’ utility.85 It is also not possible 
to measure the probabilities in the expected utility model.86 Even if 
utility and probability can be measured separately, multiplication may 
not be the right way to combine them.87 Utility is, for most people, not 
simply a function of consumption, or consumption and leisure; it may, 
for example, also include a taste for fairness, or a preference for (or 
against) complying with tax law, or any number of other things.88 Most 
versions of the expected utility model do not take into account transac-
tion costs (such as, for example, the cost of defending oneself against 
                                                                                                                      
79 Id. at 749. 
80 Id. at 786. 
81 Chris William Sanchirico, A Critical Look at the Economic Argument for Taxing Only La-
bor Income, 63 Tax L. Rev. 867, 903–16 (2010). 
82 Id. at 905. 
83 Id. at 940. 
84 See generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1471 (1998) (advancing an approach to the economic analysis of law that acknowl-
edges that people are not rational actors). 
85 See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, New Foundations of Cost-
Benefit Analysis 23–24 (2006). 
86 See generally Sarah B. Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law’s Uncertainty, 157 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 1017 (2009) (arguing that probability statements in tax law are best understood as 
a reflection of the speaker’s beliefs). 
87 E.g., Bengt Hansson, The Appropriateness of the Expected Utility Model, 9 Erkenntnis 
175, 177 (1975). 
88 Sarah B. Lawsky, Fairly Random: On Compensating Audited Taxpayers, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 
161, 189–91 (2008). 
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the Internal Revenue Service).89 The expected utility model cannot 
take into account that the probability that a position will be struck 
down is unknown, and that some, perhaps most, individuals are not 
uncertainty-neutral.90 It is not possible to make interpersonal compari-
sons of utility.91 Even a single individual does not have a single utility 
function; rather, a person’s utility function may change over time, espe-
cially if that person’s income changes over time.92 And this is only a 
partial list of ways that the expected utility model is not realistic. 
                                                                                                                     
 Both the optimal tax model and the expected utility model are thus 
based on profoundly, even absurdly, incorrect and simplified assump-
tions. If these models are meant to be no more than smaller, manage-
able, but still somewhat realistic representations of the real world, then 
they fail miserably. 
C. Predictors 
1. The Idea 
 Perhaps we should not be concerned that the assumptions under-
lying these models are unrealistic. All models are simplified.93 “The 
map is not the territory,”94 nor would a map that corresponded directly 
to the world be of much use.95 More specifically, Milton Friedman fa-
 
 
89 Id. at 169. 
90 See generally Sarah B. Lawsky, Unknown Probabilities and the Tax Law, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2013) (presenting a model of tax compliance that takes into account tax-
payer attitudes toward uncertainty). 
91 See generally Daniel M. Hausman, The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons, 
104 Mind 473 (1995) (arguing that it is impossible to make comparisons of utility among 
individuals); Robbins, supra note 18, at 12–13. But see, e.g., Adler & Posner, supra note 85, 
at 40–52 (proposing a method for interpersonal comparisons). 
92 Harry Markowitz, The Utility of Wealth, 60 J. Pol. Econ. 151, 152 (1952). 
93 E.g., Uskali Mäki, Realistic Realism About Unrealistic Models, in The Oxford Hand-
book of Philosophy of Economics 68, 70–71 (Harold Kincaid & Don Ross eds., 2009) 
(“Economic models involve idealizations just like the most respectable physical theories 
do: just think of the idealizations of frictionless plane, perfectly elastic gas molecule, rigid 
body, planets as mass points, two-body solar system. . . . It became clear that falsehood in 
assumptions will not be sufficient grounds for [e.g., Milton Friedman’s] antirealist instru-
mentalism about economic theory.”); id. at 72 (“Much of the criticism of economics is . . . 
based on the mistaken belief that criticism is easy—such as when inferring from unrealistic 
assumptions to models being incorrect.”). 
94 Alfred Korzybski, A Non-Aristotelian System and Its Necessity for Rigour in Mathematics 
and Physics, in Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems 
and General Semantics 747, 750 (5th ed. 1994). 
95 See, e.g., Jorge Luis Borges, On Exactitude in Science, in Collected Fictions 325 
(Andrew Hurley trans., 1999); Lewis Carroll, Sylvie and Bruno Concluded 169 (Lon-
don, MacMillan & Co. 1893) (“‘We actually made a map of the country, on the scale of a 
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mously responded to the objection that economic models’ assumptions 
are so wrong as to render these models useless by arguing that the test 
of a model is not whether its assumptions are realistic, but rather how 
well the model predicts the future.96 “Complete ‘realism’ is clearly un-
attainable,” he acknowledged, but “the question whether a theory is 
realistic ‘enough’ can be settled only by seeing whether it yields predic-
tions that are good enough for the purpose in hand or that are better 
than predictions from alternative theories.”97 
                                                                                                                     
 Indeed, Friedman argued that the more unrealistic the assump-
tions, the better the theory: “A hypothesis is important if it ‘explains’ 
much by little . . . if it abstracts the common and crucial elements from 
the mass of complex and detailed circumstances . . . and permits valid 
predictions on the basis of them alone.”98 Friedman suggested that 
theories take an “as if” approach: it does not matter whether the as-
sumptions are realistic, but whether the world behaves as if the assump-
tions are realistic.99 For example, it is surely not true that leaves on a 
tree seek to maximize the amount of sunlight they receive, but the 
leaves are positioned as if that were true, and thus “leaves on a tree seek 
to maximize the amount of sunlight they receive” may be a useful the-
ory for some circumstances. Criticizing a theory for unrealistic assump-
tions is, Friedman argued, “largely beside the point”; the only question 
is whether changing an assumption improves the accuracy of the the-
ory’s predictions.100 Theorists should be concerned with “analytic rele-
vance,” not “descriptive accuracy.”101 
 Friedman’s essay has been highly influential in law and economics 
scholarship. Judge Richard Posner, one of the founders of the law and 
economics movement, has embraced Friedman’s position. In a 1975 
article citing Friedman’s essay, now-Judge Posner wrote, “[T]he econ-
 
mile to the mile! . . . It has never been spread out, yet . . . the farmers objected: they said it 
would cover the whole country, and shut out the sunlight! So we now use the country it-
self, as its own map, and I assure it does nearly as well.’”), quoted in Joan Robinson, Essays 
in the Theory of Economic Growth 33 (1963); Tish Rabe, There’s a Map on my Lap! 
12 (2002) (“Now, if maps were the size / of the places they show, / mapmakers would run 
/ out of paper, and so . . . .”); Robinson, supra, at 33 (“A model which took account of all 
the variegation of reality would be of no more use than a map at the scale of one to one.”). 
96 Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in Essays in Positive Eco-
nomics 3 (1953). This is not the only important claim in Friedman’s essay, but it is the 
most important one for purposes of this Article. 
97 Id. at 41. 
98 Id. at 14. 
99 Id. at 41. 
100 Id. at 31. 
101 Id. at 41. 
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omist is not interested in the question whether and in what sense peo-
ple may be said to be ‘rational.’ It is enough for purposes of economic 
analysis that the assumption of rationality has greater explanatory pow-
er than alternative assumptions.”102 Although Judge Posner does not 
cite Friedman explicitly, he takes a similar, though somewhat more nu-
anced, approach in the 2011 edition of his casebook Economic Analysis of 
Law: 
[L]ack of realism in the sense of descriptive completeness, far 
from invalidating the theory, is a precondition of theory. . . . 
[W]e need not try to evaluate [a model’s] assumptions di-
rectly in order to evaluate it. Judged by the test of explanatory 
power, economic theory is a significant . . . success. . . . An-
other (and stronger—why?) test of a scientific theory is its 
predictive power.103 
Friedman’s essay has also been cited many times in legal scholarship for 
the proposition that in economics, the best test of a model is its predic-
tive power.104 
 Following Friedman’s essay, then, one might argue that we should 
not care about whether the assumptions in the expected utility model 
are unrealistic. We should care only whether the model accurately pre-
                                                                                                                      
102 Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 Tex. L. Rev. 757, 763 n.25 
(1975). 
103 Posner, supra note 19, at 21. One oddity of a casebook is that the parenthetical 
“why?” can stand as a teaching moment, and tends to suggest that the casebook’s author, 
and perhaps the student’s professor as well, know the answer. 
104 Jeanne L. Schroeder, Just So Stories: Posnerian Methodology, 22 Cardozo L. Rev. 351, 
355 n.17 (2001) (providing numerous examples of this claim in legal scholarship, and 
noting that this is also Judge Posner’s approach). The citations have continued apace since 
Jeanne Schroeder’s piece was published. See, e.g., Robert J. Condlin, Legal Bargaining The-
ory’s New “Prospecting” Agenda, 10 Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J. 215, 246 & n.128 (2010) (citing 
Friedman’s essay to support the proposition that “[l]ike economics, Prospect Theory may 
have useful prescriptive advice to give to legal bargainers even if the advice is grounded in 
an inaccurate empirical understanding of legal bargaining”); Fleur Johns, Financing as 
Governance, 31 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 391, 405 & n.53 (2011) (citing Friedman’s essay to 
support the proposition that “[t]he recurrent inaccuracy of key assumptions on which 
models are built for the financing of urban infrastructure is not generally regarded as a 
sign of weakness in the models themselves, nor as cause to question the basic logic of fi-
nancial modelling. This is because modelling practice always already contemplates the 
unreality of the assumptions on which it is founded.”); René Reich-Graefe, Deconstructing 
Corporate Governance: Director Primacy Without Principle?, 16 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 465, 
469 n.12 (2011) (citing Friedman’s essay to support the proposition that “[p]redictive 
ability and accuracy is, of course, the main criterion by which positive (descriptive) eco-
nomic models are evaluated”). 
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dicts behavior. This was in fact Friedman’s argument for using expected 
utility theory: 
An objection to [expected utility theory] . . . is that it conflicts 
with the way human beings actually behave and choose. . . . 
[T]his objection is not strictly relevant. The hypothesis does 
not assert that individuals explicitly or consciously calculate 
and compare expected utilities. . . . The hypothesis asserts ra-
ther that . . . individuals behave as if they calculated and com-
pared expected utility and as if they knew the odds.105 
 On this understanding of models, the purpose of a model is to 
predict—not to describe, and not to help us understand a phenome-
non. Moreover, we cannot answer in the abstract whether the model is 
accurate enough. We must know what question we are trying to answer, 
and whether the predictions are accurate enough for that particular 
question, in that particular context.106 
2. Beyond Prediction 
 Within economics, however, Friedman’s approach, though influ-
ential,107 is far from uncontroversial. As early as 1963, Paul Samuelson 
objected to what he dubbed the “Friedman Twist,” or the “F-Twist,” the 
idea that “[a] theory is vindicable if (some of) its consequences are 
empirically valid to a useful degree of approximation; the (empirical) 
unrealism of the theory ‘itself,’ or its ‘assumptions,’ is quite irrelevant 
to its validity and worth.”108 Samuelson insisted that although “unrealis-
tic, abstract” models could be useful, this does not mean that they are 
empirically valid. “If the abstract models contain empirical falsities,” 
Samuelson argued, “we must jettison the models, not gloss over their 
inadequacies.”109 
 The economics literature contains many other critiques. For ex-
ample, as Hausman explains, Friedman fails if he means to present an 
argument, rather than a mere pronouncement.110 According to Haus-
                                                                                                                      
105 Milton Friedman & L.J. Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. Pol. 
Econ. 279, 297–98 (1948). 
106 See id. at 298. 
107 See, e.g., Thomas Mayer, The Influence of Friedman’s Methodological Essay, in The 
Methodology of Positive Economics: Reflections on the Milton Friedman Legacy 
119 (Uskali Mäki ed., 2009). 
108 Paul A. Samuelson et al., Discussion, 53 Am. Econ. Rev. 227, 232 (1963). 
109 Id. at 236. 
110 Hausman, supra note 67, at 162–69. 
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man, Friedman first asserts that “[a] good hypothesis provides valid and 
meaningful predictions.”111 But this premise does not imply, as Fried-
man suggests, that “[t]he only test of whether an hypothesis is a good 
hypothesis is whether it provides valid and meaningful predictions,” 
thus rendering anything else about the hypothesis, including the truth 
of its assumptions, irrelevant.112 As Hausman points out, Friedman’s 
argument is in form the same as asserting that “[a] good used car drives 
reliably,” leaping from there to claiming that the only test of a good 
used car is whether it drives reliably, and concluding that anything one 
might learn about the car from looking under the hood is irrelevant.113 
Just as a single road test does not predict a car’s entire future perform-
ance, so we cannot know in advance how a theory will perform in new 
circumstances.114 
 The problem with Friedman’s approach is perhaps even more 
acute within legal scholarship if one believes that legal scholarship’s 
purposes could include more than policy prescriptions.115 I focus here 
on two problems for legal scholarship of Friedman’s goal of prediction. 
 First, although some legal scholarship may be intently policy-
focused, concerned only with what immediate changes to make to the 
real world, other scholarship is less immediately connected with direct 
legal change. Some scholars hope only to advance understanding of 
some aspect of the law, or to create a platform from which more practi-
cal scholars may build. To adopt Friedman’s goal of prediction, and 
only prediction, is to say that economic models cannot help further our 
understanding or play a role in more abstract reasoning. If, for exam-
ple, one’s only goal is to predict on which side of a tree we will find 
more leaves, then Friedman’s model—that “leaves on a tree seek to 
maximize the amount of sunlight they receive” —might be sufficient.116 
But as Jeanne Schroeder points out, it would be an odd biologist in-
deed who “would be satisfied, as Friedman is, with the statement that 
trees look ‘as if’” their leaves moved in such a way.117 “Rather, [Schroe-
der] would expect botanists to be interested in learning precisely what 
                                                                                                                      
111 Id. at 166. 
112 Id. (emphasis added). 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
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process causes leaves to become so clustered.”118 Similarly, if models are 
to help legal scholars who actually want to understand the process by 
which, for example, a taxpayer chooses whether to comply with the tax 
law, then models must do more than just predict. 
 Moreover, it is impossible to check whether some of the models on 
which legal scholarship relies make correct predictions. We might be 
able to check whether the expected utility model accurately predicts tax 
compliance.119 But it is more difficult to check the predictions of the 
optimal taxation model, which attempts to describe a tax system that 
maximizes welfare. The optimal tax model is highly unlikely to be im-
plemented anywhere, and even if it were implemented, it would be ex-
tremely difficult—if not simply impossible—to determine whether it 
maximized welfare.120 Thus, even if we accept Friedman’s approach of 
testing models by how well they predict, we cannot implement it be-
cause we cannot test many of the models we use. 
 If we accept these critiques, is anything left of the models used by 
tax legal scholars? How can such unrealistic models, some of whose 
predictions cannot even be checked, be useful? I next present an ap-
proach to understanding and using models drawn from recent work in 
the philosophy of science in general, and the philosophy of economics 
in particular, that suggests that models are more than just lesser, flawed 
representations of the real world, and that even a very unrealistic mod-
el can be useful, even if not for Friedman’s reasons. 
                                                                                                                      
118 Id. Cf. Anna Alexandrova, When Analytic Narratives Explain, 3 J. Phil. Hist. 1, 9 
(2009) (explaining that scholars who attempt to integrate formal models and narrative 
explanations reject Friedman’s approach because, for “the historically-minded social scien-
tists who advocate [this approach,] . . . explanation requires identification of causal mecha-
nisms responsible for bringing about a phenomenon, not just its correct prediction”). 
119 Most people who have examined the question think that the expected utility does 
not predict compliance well. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Louis L. Wilde, The Economics of 
Tax Compliance: Facts and Fantasy, 38 Nat’l Tax J. 355, 358 (1985). One recent article, 
however, argues that in fact the expected utility model does not do a bad job of explaining 
compliance, even excluding compliance due to withholding and information reporting. 
See Timothy Shapiro, The Myth of Tax Morale? (May 27, 2011) (unpublished paper) (on 
file with author). 
120 Cf. Mark Blaug, Ugly Currents in Modern Economics, in Fact and Fiction in Econom-
ics 35, 49–50 (Uskali Mäki ed., 2002) (noting that some theories, such as the general equi-
librium theory, are “untestable even in principle”). 
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D. Credible Worlds 
 Models as currently used in legal scholarship are probably best con-
sidered to construct parallel, fictional, but “credible worlds.”121 From 
this perspective, models are “hypothetical constructions that neverthe-
less may give us some understanding of the real world.”122 We can rea-
son within the model deductively, moving through an argument purely 
logically, but deductive logic does not provide a way to jump from the 
model to the real world. 
 Robert Sugden is the most prominent recent proponent of this 
fictionalist understanding, which he calls the “credible worlds” ap-
proach.123 Sugden uses Thomas Schelling’s “checkerboard city” model 
to explain this understanding of models. This Section first describes the 
checkerboard city model, and then extracts principles for credible 
worlds from Sugden’s work. 
 Schelling created his checkerboard city model to show that segre-
gation in housing could arise not only from a conscious desire to live in 
a starkly segregated area, but also from individuals’ desire not to live in a 
neighborhood in which the overwhelming majority of people are of a 
different group.124 Schelling asks us to mark out a grid of squares “at 
least the size of a checkerboard” and to distribute coins across the grid, 
some pennies and some dimes, leaving some empty spaces.125 Then we 
set a rule—for example, that a coin is “content” (stays where it is) if at 
least half of his neighbors (defined as the eight squares immediately 
around him) are the same as he. (Schelling refers to a coin as “he” or 
“him,” not “it.”) Whenever we find a coin that is not content, we move 
him to the nearest empty square where he is content.126 Of course, mov-
ing one coin may make another coin not content. We must keep moving 
coins until none are discontented. For many numbers of dimes and 
                                                                                                                      
121 See generally Robert Sugden, Credible Worlds, Capacities and Mechanisms, 70 Erk-
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pennies, many initial distributions, and many rules for contentness, the 
coins will end up sharply segregated.127 
 This model is clever, provocative, easy to understand, and seems to 
tell us something about how segregated neighborhoods arise.128 Schel-
ling seems to think that it should: “The first impact of a display like this 
on a reader may be—unless he finds it irrelevant—discouragement. A 
moderate urge to avoid small-minority status may cause a nearly inte-
grated pattern to unravel, and highly segregated neighborhoods to 
form.”129 
 Schelling may exempt the reader who finds his model irrelevant 
precisely because it is not clear why we should find it relevant.130 How 
do we get information about segregated neighborhoods in the real 
world from the checkerboard city model? The model’s assumptions are 
unrealistic in the extreme. People are not all identical except for one 
characteristic.131 People do not live in tiny squares, and most people do 
not even live in housing organized in rectangular grids.132 Most people 
do not make decisions about moving based only on the precise per-
centage of their neighbors who belong to a particular group. Even if 
they did, neither the percentage, nor what constituted a “neighbor,” 
would be the same for all people. A person who moves does not choose 
where to move by finding the closest house with an acceptable number 
of neighbors who belong to a particular group. Even more basically: 
people are not dimes or pennies. And so forth. Yet we are asked, some-
how, to make a jump from the model world of coins on paper to the 
real world. 
 To make this leap, we must reason ampliatively.133 The checker-
board city model thus creates an argument about the world in two 
steps: a deductive step and then an ampliative step. First, the model 
                                                                                                                      
127 You can try it yourself at any number of websites. See, e.g., Luis R. Izquierdo et al., 
Schelling’s Model of Spatial Segregation, http://luis.izqui.org/models/schelling/ 
index.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2012). Interestingly, although Schelling’s model does serve 
to illustrate Sugden’s theory, Schelling’s model has much in common with a simulation, 
which arguably raises a separate set of questions. Thanks to Ben Alarie for this point. 
128 See Sugden, supra note 29, at 24 (stating that Schelling created “a set of imaginary 
cities, whose workings we can easily understand”). 
129 Schelling, supra note 124, at 154. 
130 Schelling does not tell us why we might or might not find it irrelevant, but he seems 
to think that some readers, at least, will not find it irrelevant. See id. 
131 Sugden, supra note 29, at 17. 
132 Id. 
133 Sugden says that we make this leap by reasoning inductively, by moving “from specific 
propositions to more general ones.” Id. at 20. It is not clear to me that the move is, in fact, 
inductive, but it is certainly ampliative, and induction is a type of ampliative reasoning. 
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shows through deductive reasoning that repeatedly applying a single 
rule about the location of coins leads to separation of the two types of 
coins. Then, ampliatively, we move from this specific example to the 
more general case of the real world. 
 We should not make this jump for every model, of course. We can 
make the jump from the model to the real world only if the model is 
similar in relevant ways to the real world. Sugden claims that we make 
leaps from a model to the real world when the model creates a credible 
world.134 
 Sugden suggests three criteria to evaluate when a model creates a 
more (or less) credible world. First, credible worlds have rules that are 
relevantly similar to the real world.135 Second, credible worlds show us 
results that are consistent with what we believe about the real world.136 
Third, credible worlds are internally coherent.137 
 First, a model creates a credible world when it is similar in relevant 
ways to the real world. For example, the checkerboard city model as-
sumes that people have mild segregationist preferences, which fits with 
sociological evidence, intuition, and experience. We would be less 
compelled by the model if it assumed that people have strong prefer-
ences for integration, showed that this leads to integrated neighbor-
hoods, and concluded that neighborhoods are segregated because of 
intentional government central planning. The assumption that people 
have strong preferences for integration would have a strong effect on 
the outcome of the model and would not fit with what we know of the 
real world. 
 Similarly, we would be unpersuaded by a tax model that assumed 
that a person’s overall utility (not marginal utility—overall utility) de-
creases for each dollar a person earns past, say, $100,000. This assump-
tion would not fit with what most people believe about the world. Thus 
we would not be persuaded by the model’s conclusion that to maximize 
welfare, the marginal tax rate above $100,000 should be 100%. Again, 
the assumption that people’s utility decreases in this way has a strong 
effect on the recommended marginal rate, and would not fit with what 
we know about the world. 
 Second, credible worlds show us results that are similar to what we 
see in the real world. In the checkerboard city model’s imaginary “cit-
ies,” stark segregation between unlike groups (dimes and pennies) 
                                                                                                                      
134 Id. at 23–27. 
135 Id. at 25. 
136 Id. at 26. 
137 Sugden, supra note 29, at 26. 
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emerges even when imagined discriminatory preferences are mild. 
When we look at real cities, we also see segregation between unlike 
groups (in the real world, racial groups). “Since the same effects are 
found in both real and imaginary cities,” Sugden explains, “it is at least 
credible to suppose that the same causes are responsible. Thus, we have 
been given some reason to think that segregation in real cities is caused 
by preferences for segregation, and that the extent of segregation is 
invariant to changes in the strength of those preferences.”138 The world 
of “checkerboard city” is not real, but it could be real, based on what we 
think we know about the laws governing the real world. 
 Third, models in economics are more credible if they are inter-
nally coherent: a credible world’s assumptions should fit naturally to-
gether. Sugden gives the example of a model that assumes, apparently 
without justification, that in some contexts agents are well-informed 
and rational, and in other contexts are poorly informed and act based 
on heuristics.139 Sugden finds such models unconvincing, because their 
“results cannot be seen to follow naturally from a clear conception of 
how the world might be.”140 We can get a sense of what Sugden means 
by internal coherence by thinking about a fantasy or science fiction 
movie.141 A science fiction movie can be more or less credible, depend-
ing in part on whether it is true to the rules it establishes within itself. 
As one example of internal incoherence, in Star Wars: Episode II 142 (ac-
tually the fifth Star Wars movie released), the droid R2-D2 can fly, but in 
Star Wars: Episodes IV through VI (the first through third Star Wars mov-
ies released), he cannot fly. Thus the movies are not consistent with 
themselves. We can make up an explanation for R2-D2’s inability to fly 
in the “later” episodes, of course. (In this case, the canonical answer 
seems to be that his jets came with only a twenty-year warranty.)143 But 
this sort of ad hoc solution is not particularly satisfying, just as ad hoc 
exceptions to assumptions in models are unsatisfying.144 
                                                                                                                      
 
138 Id. at 24. 
139 Id. at 26. 
140 Id. 
141 Sugden uses the example of a novel. See id. at 23–24. 
142 Star Wars: Episode II—Attack of the Clones (Lucasfilm 2002). 
143 See Answers to Your Star Wars Questions, Star Wars Insider, Sept. 2002, at 96, 96; IA 
Caps Droid Rocket Warranty at 20 Years, HoloNet News, http://www.holonetnews.com/55/ 
business/1359_2.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2012). 
144 Cf. W. Bradley Wendel, Explanation in Legal Scholarship: The Inferential Structure of Doc-
trinal Legal Analysis, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 1035, 1070 (2011). W. Bradley Wendel has applied 
the philosophy of science idea of “inference to the best explanation” to understand certain 
types of doctrinal scholarship. Id. (“[A] good theory . . . conveys a sense that order has 
been create[d] out of apparent chaos. There is an inevitable aesthetic dimension to evalu-
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 Sugden’s criteria for credible worlds are impressionistic; there is 
no deductive, foolproof way to know whether a model is the same in 
relevant ways to the real world (what ways are relevant?), or whether a 
model’s assumptions fit “naturally” together. Some find this uncertainty 
disquieting.145 But this is exactly the point. The leap between a model 
and the real world cannot be filled with certainty, and we are justified in 
making the leap if the model seems believable enough to us. 
 That a model “seems believable” cannot, of course, be the end of 
the matter. As the next Part explains, the conversation that arises when 
a modeler is asked to justify his leap can itself be of great value. 
III. Shaping Conversation: Credible Worlds and Legal 
Scholarship 
 This Part uses the credible world understanding to show how 
models can be used in legal scholarship. Section A describes how a 
model can be useful by creating the structure for conversations.146 Sec-
tion B focuses on possible objections to the leap from a model to the 
real world and possible responses to those objections.147 Finally, Section 
C suggests some ways that models’ creators can make their models 
more accessible and useful to legal scholarship.148 
A. Learning from Deductive Reasoning 
 A model, as I have defined it for this Article, uses only deductive 
reasoning internally. Thus a model cannot provide any new facts about 
the world.149 That logical propositions are tautological, however, does 
not mean that a deductive argument can add nothing to knowledge, 
for there can, of course, be conclusions implicit in a set of premises 
that are not (yet) known, and which can be laid bare by a deductive 
                                                                                                                      
ating a legal explanation. . . . [Less successful] attempts at unification [of disparate legal 
outcomes] feel ad hoc or strained.”). 
145 See, e.g., Eckhart Arnold, Tools or Toys? 19 (SRC SimTech, Stuttgart Preprint Series, No. 
2010-36, 2010), available at http://www.eckhartarnold.de/papers/2010_MS4/tools_or_toys. 
pdf (“[Sugden’s approach] raises more questions than it answers: In what sense can a world 
that is ‘counterfactual’ still be credible? And what are the criteria by which the credibility of a 
‘counterfactual’ model must be judged?”). 
146 See infra notes 149–156 and accompanying text. 
147 See infra notes 157–177 and accompanying text. 
148 See infra notes 178–180 and accompanying text. 
149 E.g., Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 155 (1922) (“The 
propositions of logic are tautologies.”). 
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argument.150 A model that creates a credible world thus may help us 
adjust or clarify our thinking. It may “support conjectures,”151 even 
“elicit new beliefs,” as it brings into focus “vague and rather unspecified 
intuitions.”152 
 For example, the optimal tax model begins with a set of fairly 
common, unsurprising assumptions; even if these assumptions are not 
true in the real world, they are standard assumptions for economic 
models. James Mirrlees uses only deductive reasoning to travel from 
these assumptions to his conclusion that, given these assumptions, the 
best redistributive progressive tax system involves, among other things, 
low marginal tax rates for high earners.153 Mirrlees reaches his results 
through deductive reasoning, so the results are in some sense implicit 
in his assumptions. But Mirrlees’ results are nonetheless surprising— 
indeed, they were surprising to Mirrlees himself: “I must confess,” he 
writes, “that I had expected the rigorous analysis of income-taxation in 
the utilitarian manner to provide an argument for high tax rates. It has 
not done so.”154 
 Thus, although Mirrlees’ model does not (as Mirrlees is very care-
ful to say) teach directly about the real world,155 it still teaches us some-
thing new: that a set of admittedly unrealistic but nonetheless common 
economic assumptions implies that tax rates on high earners should be 
low. This conclusion shapes all subsequent conversations about struc-
turing a progressive tax system. One cannot say that one supports high 
marginal rates on high earners simply because one supports a progres-
sive tax system, because Mirrlees has shown that given some combina-
tion of assumptions, the best progressive tax system has low marginal 
rates on high earners.156 Now there must be an affirmative argument 
for high marginal rates for high earners, and that argument must re-
spond to Mirrlees’ model. Mirrlees’ model has, in other words, helped 
                                                                                                                      
150 E.g., Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Surprises in Logic, in Logica Yearbook 2009, at 47, 51–
52 (Michal Pelis ed., 2010) (“[T]o be a tautology is a factual (albeit necessary) property of 
propositions, whereas the phenomenon of surprises concerns the recognition by an agent 
that some object a has property P.”). 
151 Sugden, supra note 121, at 7. 
152 Till Grüne-Yanoff, Learning from Minimal Economic Models, 70 Erkenntnis 81, 94 
(2009). 
153 Mirrlees, supra note 27, at 207. 
154 Id. 
155 E.g., id. at 207–08 (explaining why he would “hesitate to apply” various of his con-
clusions to the real world). 
156 See id. at 207. Thanks to David Hasen for this point. 
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shape the conversation about progressive rate structure. The next Sec-
tion explains how that conversation might proceed. 
B. Learning from Ampliative Reasoning 
 Models may do their most important work by not working. Models 
contribute to the legal conversation not only by creating credible 
worlds, but also by provoking people to explain why a given model’s 
world is not credible. This Section lays out possible objections to models 
and shows how responding to those objections can make richer every-
one’s understanding of the question at hand. 
 There are two types of critiques of a model. First, a model’s deduc-
tive reasoning may be wrong. Second, a model may not present a cred-
ible world—that is, the ampliative leap between the model and the real 
world may not be warranted. 
 Whether a model’s deductive reasoning is wrong is a question of 
logic. Either the model is wrong or it is not. Thus, this critique is the 
least interesting (though arguably most powerful) form of critique. 
There is only one possible response to a showing that one’s model fails 
as a matter of deductive logic: “I’m sorry, let me fix that.” Unsurpris-
ingly, it is difficult to find an example of this sort of critique in print, as 
these mistakes are usually caught before publication. Here is one 
(made-up) example: Imagine a person working with the expected utility 
model, in which a person complies with the tax law when the expected 
utility of complying exceeds the expected utility of not complying. As-
sume that utility is defined (as it often is) as the natural log of income. It 
is simply wrong to say that the utility of one’s income, less the utility of 
the tax paid, equals the utility of one’s income less tax paid.157 
 A model whose deductive reasoning is correct nevertheless may be 
subject to critiques—specifically, critiques that attempt to cast doubt on 
the validity of the leap between the model and the real world. There 
are at least three ways to critique such a model’s credibility. 
 First, the substance of an assumption may be wrong. To take a silly 
example, return to our friend from the Introduction who says, “Your 
model deals with something called ‘dollars,’ so it doesn’t apply to my 
situation, because I am trying to figure out about tax compliance in 
Belgium, where the currency is called ‘Euros.’” This person is arguing 
                                                                                                                      
157 That is, U(I) – U(T) is not equal to U(I – T), because ln(I) – ln(T) is not equal to 
ln(I – T). ln(I) – ln(T) = ln(I/T). This is a fact about logarithms. If someone wrote an 
article in which he set U(*) equal to ln(*) and then claimed that U(I) – U(T) equaled U(I 
– T), he would be wrong. 
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that something in the model does not match up with something in (the 
relevant portion of) the real world, and that therefore the model can-
not apply to his real world. 
 Second, the model may simplify a fact about the world. For exam-
ple, many law review articles that apply the expected utility model de-
scribed above assume that people have declining marginal utility.158 In 
reality, people do not seem to have stable utility functions, and even if 
they did, those utility functions would not all demonstrate declining 
marginal utility.159 
 Third, and closely related to the second critique, the model may 
omit a fact about the world. Again returning to the expected utility 
model, one might object that people do not take into account only the 
money they will have after they comply or do not comply with the tax 
law, but also have feelings about what it means to comply or not com-
ply—perhaps they feel like chumps for complying, or perhaps they be-
lieve that it is their duty to comply with the tax law, even if it does not 
seem to make financial sense to them. The difference between simplify-
ing a fact and omitting a fact is more a matter of degree rather than 
kind, as simplifying a fact is usually the result of omitting another fact. 
Nonetheless, it is helpful to keep the two as separate categories, to keep 
track of when a critique introduces a mostly new concept (for example, 
an individual valuing something other than money) as opposed to mak-
ing more complicated a concept that already exists within the model 
(for example, the shape of an individual’s utility function). 
 The latter two critiques (and perhaps the first as well) are always 
true of all models. All models make simplifying assumptions, and all 
models omit facts about the world. To show that these critiques are rele-
vant, the critic must go further and show that because of the critique, 
the model does not create a credible world, and that therefore we 
should not make the ampliative leap from the model to the real world. 
 A modeler who wishes to defend his model has at least four possi-
ble responses to these critiques: disagree with the substance of the cri-
tique; stand by the assumption as a moral claim; refuse to modify the 
assumption because the change makes the model unworkable; or, most 
closely related to the credible worlds understanding, claim that chang-
ing the assumption does not affect the outcome. 
                                                                                                                      
158 See Thomas D. Griffith, Progressive Taxation and Happiness, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 1363, 1363 
(2004); see also Bankman & Griffith, supra note 30, at 1947 (discussing the “declining mar-
ginal utility” assumption). 
159 See Jolls et al., supra note 84, at 1477. 
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 First, the modeler may disagree with the critique. No, the modeler 
may say, the substance of my assumption is not wrong. No, I have not 
simplified a fact about the world: all people have declining marginal 
utility. No, I have not omitted a fact about the world: people do not 
take anything into account other than money. These are empirical 
claims, and require evidence about the world to support them. 
 Second, the modeler may accept the critique, but respond that as a 
moral matter, the assumption should be true, and therefore he will act 
as if it is true. The assumption is, in other words, a normative judg-
ment. For example, a model may include the assumption that all indi-
viduals have declining marginal utility, and it may include this assump-
tion not because all individuals do have declining marginal utility, but 
rather because the modeler believes that we should treat people as if 
the next dollar is worth less to a rich person than to a poor person.160 If 
the model’s recommendations depend on this assumption, this admis-
sion makes the model useful only to the extent one agrees with the 
normative judgment. 
 Third, the modeler may respond that changing the assumption in 
question would make the model unworkable. Acknowledging that peo-
ple have wildly different utility functions, for example, might make it 
too difficult to implement the optimal tax model.161 This is not a par-
ticularly useful response, as it does nothing to assuage concerns about 
the credibility of the world the model creates. 
 Finally, the modeler may accept the critique, but argue that mak-
ing the suggested change would not affect the results of the model, ei-
ther in general or for the modeler’s particular purposes. For example, 
the objection that the currency is named “Euros,” not “dollars,” is not a 
relevant objection. The name of the currency does not affect the mod-
el. The currency could be called “Noodles”; it could be called anything. 
(This is not to say that the location of the taxpayers does not matter— 
simply that the name of the currency involved is not, in itself, impor-
tant.) In other words, the model does not match up to the real world, 
but that does not matter, because even if the model did match up to 
the real world, the model’s results would be exactly the same. To put 
this in the language of credible worlds: the critic is arguing that the 
model’s world is not credible because it varies in a particular way from 
                                                                                                                      
160 See generally Lawsky, supra note 49 (examining the assumption that an additional 
dollar is worth more to a poor person than it is to a wealthy person). 
161 It is actually possible to model somewhat heterogeneous preferences. See generally Mi-
khail Golosov et al., Preference Heterogeneity and Optimal Capital Income Taxation (NBER Working 
Paper 16619, 2010) (examining preference heterogeneity with two types of taxpayer). 
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the real world; the modeler responds that the world cannot lack credi-
bility for that reason, because within the model’s world, that particular 
fact is irrelevant. This might be related to why science fiction can seem 
so relevant to our world: superficial differences do not necessarily affect 
deep underlying similarities. Some people thought the movie Avatar 
was racist;162 others, including the film’s maker, argued that it was 
not;163 but it would have been a weak defense indeed to claim that the 
film was not racist because it was about blue people, and people in the 
real world are not blue. 
 To see examples of these objections and responses in action, and 
how the debate around a model can itself enhance understanding of 
important questions, turn again to the debate surrounding Joseph 
Bankman and David Weisbach’s article The Superiority of an Ideal Con-
sumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax.164 This article presents a credible 
world and suggests that we should link that credible world to the real 
world. The article claims to “compare only the ideal forms of income 
and consumption taxation. The actual choice of a tax system has to be 
based on how the system would be implemented.”165 Although Bank-
man and Weisbach limit themselves to comparing the ideal forms of 
taxation, their claims address which of these systems would be best in 
the real world. They do not limit themselves to purely conceptual ex-
ploration. Thus, they claim that their article should “help[] us design 
actual systems” and to “understand the flaws of actual systems.”166 
 In response, Daniel Shaviro cautioned against applying the model 
to the real world, because, he explained, changing the assumptions un-
der which Bankman and Weisbach operated by making those assump-
tions more coherent with the real world may also change the recom-
mendation of the model: “Departures from the assumptions . . . have . . . 
effects on the otherwise compelling welfare economics case for con-
sumption taxation. . . . [T]hey introduce enough noise to make any def-
inite conclusion about the ideal system less tenable than it would other-
wise be.”167 
                                                                                                                      
162 See, e.g., Annalee Newitz, When Will White People Stop Making Movies Like Avatar?, 
io9.com (Dec. 18, 2009, 1:58 PM), http://io9.com/5422666/when-will-white-people-stop-
making-movies-like-avatar. 
163 See Gary Susman, Is ‘Avatar’ Racist?, moviefone ( Jan. 11, 2010, 6:15 PM) http:// 
blog.moviefone.com/2010/01/11/is-avatar-racist/. 
164 See generally Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 42 (comparing an income tax and a 
consumption tax). 
165 Id. at 1414–15. 
166 Id. at 1415. 
167 Shaviro, supra note 58, at 786. 
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 For example, Bankman and Weisbach’s model is based in part on 
an assumption that consumption can be smoothed over time, by bor-
rowing.168 Shaviro argues that this assumption does not cohere with the 
real world (probably in the sense that it oversimplifies), because credit 
markets are not perfect, and that if credit markets are not perfect, the 
results of the model do not hold.169 Shaviro concludes that his investi-
gation of the assumptions underlying the model “refute[s] the claim 
that an ideal consumption tax is decisively superior to an ideal income 
tax, as judged from the standpoint, not of a stylized economic model, 
but of the actual world in which we live.”170 This is not a critique of the 
model internally, but rather a suggestion that the leap to the real world 
is not warranted. 
 Bankman and Weisbach have several responses.171 First, they argue 
that in fact, credit markets are very good.172 They reject the criticism as 
wrong as a matter of fact, and argue that Shaviro’s criticism does not 
actually show a way that the model does not cohere with the real world. 
Second, they argue that their model’s conclusions are not disrupted 
even if credit markets are not perfect, because imperfect credit markets 
may not actually support an income tax.173 This is a version of saying 
that the critique is irrelevant—yes, we made this assumption in our 
model, but the assumption does not actually do much work. 
 More generally, Bankman and Weisbach agree that “more complex 
models of behavior are likely to weaken the strong conclusions one gets 
from simple models,” and that “additional research into administering 
consumption taxes should be given a high priority.”174 In other words, 
they acknowledge that one should be cautious about making the leap 
from their relatively simple model to the real world. Importantly, 
though, Shaviro’s response highlighted particular crucial assumptions 
and provoked Bankman and Weisbach to consider these assumptions 
more carefully. 
 Linda Sugin’s work provides another example of how modeling 
can serve as the basis for a conversation that helps our understanding 
                                                                                                                      
168 Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 42, at 1435. 
169 Shaviro, supra note 58, at 770–72. 
170 Id. at 786. 
171 Joseph Bankman & David Weisbach, Reply: Consumption Taxation Is Still Superior to In-
come Taxation, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 789, 795–802 (2007). 
172 Id. at 796. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 790. 
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of the law.175 The optimal tax model prescribes a tax on ability to earn 
(an endowment tax), but Sugin shows that the model prescribes this 
result only if one accepts assumptions that do not cohere with the real 
world. In particular, she argues that the optimal tax model assumes that 
leisure (time spent not working in the market economy) is not produc-
tive, is “self-regarding,” and is voluntary,176 and that the endowment tax 
recommendation is derived in part from these assumptions. Changing 
the assumptions changes the result. She argues that leaps from the op-
timal tax model and the real world are not warranted because the op-
timal tax model makes certain assumptions about the nature of leisure 
that are not realistic and crucially affect the model’s prescriptions.177 
 Again, the model has done important work, but not merely by 
showing that, if one accepts the model, an endowment tax is the best 
tax. Rather, the model’s work continues when Sugin dissects its assump-
tions and shows both why they are wrong, or too simple, and how these 
wrong or simple assumptions affect the model’s recommendation. The 
model suggests to the careful reader particular points to think about 
and critique; if the endowment tax seems wrong to you, you can refute 
the model’s result, but only by making explicit how the model’s as-
sumptions are wrong and why this matters. 
C. Creating Useful Models 
 With the understanding that models warrant conclusions about 
the real world to the extent that the models create credible worlds from 
which people may reason to the real world, legal scholars who create 
and work with models can take several steps to make their models more 
useful to legal scholars.178 
                                                                                                                      
 
175 See generally Linda Sugin, A Philosophical Objection to the Optimal Tax Model, 64 Tax L. 
Rev. 229 (2011) (challenging certain assumptions underlying the optimal tax model). 
176 Id. at 245. 
177 Id. at 245–56. 
178 The question of how models should be used by policymakers is a distinct question. 
The philosopher Anna Alexandrova takes the view that the credible worlds approach does 
not provide enough guidance to create actual policy. Anna Alexandrova & Robert Northcott, 
Progress in Economics: Lessons from the Spectrum Auctions, in The Oxford Handbook of Phi-
losophy of Economics, supra note 93, at 306, 309–10. She uses a different philosophical 
approach to certain causal models, viewing them as open formulae. See, e.g., Anna Alexan-
drova, Making Models Count, 75 Phil. Sci. 383, 396–400 (2008). With this as her philosophical 
basis, she has written a wonderfully rich account of how auction models were applied to cre-
ate actual FCC spectrum auctions. Alexandrova & Northcott, supra, at 309–10. Additionally, 
Peter Diamond and Emmanuel Saez offer an example in the economics literature of mindful 
application of a model to the real world. See Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, The Case for a 
Progressive Tax: from Basic Research to Policy Recommendations, 25 J. Econ. Persps. 165, 166 
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 First, a reader will have a better sense of how to use an article’s 
model if the article explicitly describes its goal. A legal scholar might 
want to use a model to advance scholarship about that model, to dis-
agree with another scholar’s article, to make a recommendation about 
the real world, or something else.179 A model’s worth should be meas-
ured not by how true it is in the abstract, but by what it can do. And to 
know what it can do, we must know what it is asked to do. We cannot 
know how good a model is unless we know what we are trying to use it 
for. Put another way, the question, “Does this model create a credible 
world?” provides little insight. We must ask, “Does this model create a 
credible world for purpose X?” 
 A model is also more useful if the author makes explicit why the 
model creates a credible world, and how the model connects to the real 
world. Legal scholarship, like economic scholarship, often fails to tie its 
models to the real world, leaving implicit precisely what the reader is to 
make of the model. Because legal scholarship so often does make a pol-
icy recommendation, a reader of an article published in a legal journal 
that presents implications of a model but does not address how the 
model relates to the real world may take the article as having implica-
tions for the real world. Legal scholars who use models should make 
clear whether they intend to make prescriptions for the real world, and 
if so, why those prescriptions stem in some way from the model, by ex-
plaining why and how the model’s conclusions can be linked to the real 
world. 
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a model is more useful if the 
author is explicit about the assumptions and limitations inherent to the 
model. This is especially important in legal scholarship, as not all read-
ers will know that, for example, using an expected value (rather than an 
expected utility) model implies that all actors are risk-neutral.180 A mod-
el may transform someone’s intuition, but it should not do so by hiding 
its dissimilarities from the real world. Explicitly acknowledging a mod-
                                                                                                                      
(2011). Diamond and Saez take a highly practical, non-philosophical approach to the ques-
tion, but their standards for applying a model to the world are similar to those discussed 
here. 
179 E.g., Uskali Mäki, MISSing the World: Models as Isolations and Credible Surrogate Systems, 
70 Erkenntnis 29, 33 (2009) (“The pragmatic context shapes the respects and degrees of 
resemblance that are sought and judged relevant in any given act of modelling. . . . The 
purposes of representation may be epistemic—such as answering some limited explanatory 
questions or isolating an important mechanism—or non-epistemic—such as solving some 
practical problem and aiding in policy making. . . . [M]odels may be used for communicat-
ing, delivering information, persuading, impressing, excluding . . . and educating.”). 
180 Lawsky, supra note 49, at 916–17. 
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el’s assumptions and limitations may seem to weaken a law review arti-
cle, but a scholar who is open about a model’s assumptions and limita-
tions makes the model more resilient and useful by making possible a 
scholarly exchange about which assumptions matter and why. 
Conclusion 
 This Article has suggested that models work in legal scholarship by 
describing credible worlds from which we can extrapolate to our actual 
world. We make this leap not through deduction or logic, but rather 
through amplification and similarity. 
 Law and legal studies appear, as any law student learns very quickly, 
disturbingly indeterminate. Why was this case decided this way and not 
the other way? Was the judge right or wrong? If that case is heard by this 
court, how will the court decide? How can this case come out this way, 
and that case the other way? The answers often feel ad hoc. 
 The formal models of law and economics, on the other hand, 
seem to bring rigorous logic to the enterprise. As one professor has ex-
plained his conversion to law and economics:181 “I was teaching regu-
lated industries from the typical casebook which simply disclosed what 
the . . . law was. It simply didn’t make any sense to me. I was very much 
in the market . . . for some theoretical coherence.”182 Law and econom-
ics seemed to provide that theoretical coherence. The scientific pro-
gram for which law professors have yearned at least since Christopher 
Columbus Langdell appeared to have arrived: “economics is the sci-
ence of rational choice,” and that “science” can be applied to law.183 I 
suspect that one great appeal of models, and of law and economics in 
general, is that they seem to provide a way to arrive at irrefutable, nec-
essary results.184 Finally, it seems, law can work purely and deductively; 
finally, there are clear right and wrong answers. Law and economics 
seems to bring relief from common law’s relentless indeterminacy. 
                                                                                                                      
181 I use the word “conversion” advisedly. See generally Steven M. Teles, The Rise of 
the Conservative Legal Movement (2008) (discussing religious imagery in the growth 
of law and economics). 
182 Warren Schwartz, quoted in Teles, supra note 181, at 106. See generally Jerome 
Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (Transaction Publishers 2009) (1930) (discussing the 
discomfort caused by law’s indeterminacy), explained in Charles L. Barzun, Jerome Frank and 
the Modern Mind, 58 Buff. L. Rev. 1127, 1128 (2010). 
183 Posner, supra note 102, at 3. 
184 I do not suggest that this fully explains why law and economics and modeling has 
been so successful within the legal academy; that is a much more complicated question. See 
Teles, supra note 181, at 90–134, 181–219 (offering a sociological perspective). 
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 But, as this Article argues, the models of law and economics do not 
authorize irrefutable deductive reasoning about the real world. Reason-
ing from models to the real world amplifies, relies on similarity, and is 
creative and imaginative. Certainty is not one of the many benefits that 
formal models offer. This does not make modeling useless; far from it. 
Models can force us toward precision, show us ways to refine our ideas, 
and, perhaps most importantly, help shape the conversations and ar-
guments by which legal understanding moves forward. 
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